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Regional Conflict 
Management in Europe
Jo h n  S. D uffield
This chapter assesses the prospects for the successful management of conflict 
in Europe during the next decade and possibly beyond.1 It concludes that these 
prospects are, on the whole, relatively bright, for two complementary reasons. 
First, the potential for militarized conflict in Europe is relatively low in compar­
ison with other parts of the world and is likely to remain so. Second, the region 
possesses substantial institutional capabilities for collective conflict manage­
ment (CCM).2 Indeed, Europe is arguably the region where such capabilities are 
best developed and most numerous.
To be sure, this forecast is not entirely sunny, and the situation does not al­
low for complacency. In the first place, the potential for violent conflict in Eu­
rope, although relatively small, is very real. In particular, serious political con­
flicts continue to smolder in Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
(FSU). Nevertheless, more and more of the continent is being steadily trans­
formed into a “zone of peace” in which armed hostilities on any significant scale 
are highly unlikely and, increasingly, even unimaginable.3 Consequently, much 
of the conflict management activity in the region will take the form of amelio­
rating and even resolving remaining nonviolent intrastate and interstate differ­
ences, and such efforts will be greatly abetted by the processes associated with 
the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Eu­
ropean Union (EU).
A second caveat follows from the fact that the capabilities for CCM are lodged 
in several international organizations, the most important of which are the Or­
ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, and the 
EU/Western European Union (WEU) nexus. This fragmentation of capabilities 
complicates the task of CCM whenever the coordination of two or more organi­
zations is required. Thus at least as important as developing further institutional 
capacity is the task of improving the mechanisms for coordinating the activities
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of the various extant organizations. Nevertheless, the lack of centralization also 
results in a certain degree of institutional depth that allows decision makers 
greater flexibility and a wider range of options for conflict management.
The chapter is organized in four sections. The first section specifies the gen­
eral tasks of conflict management. The second identifies the most likely re­
gional sources of conflict during the next decade. A third section describes the 
existing institutional capabilities for CCM in the region. A conclusion assesses 
the adequacy of those capabilities in view of the nature and magnitude of the 
challenge, emphasizing the role that regional organizations can play in defus­
ing remaining conflicts by promoting the internal transformation of states into 
stable democracies marked by the rule of law and respect for human rights.
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
In order to assess the prospects for successful conflict management, one must 
first identify the types of conflict that are possible and the forms of conflict man­
agement that are necessary and appropriate for addressing them.
This chapter takes a broad view of the types of conflict that might be the ob­
ject of conflict management efforts in Europe. Relevant conflicts may be either 
intrastate or interstate in nature, although the former have dominated regional 
conflict managements activities since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, both 
domestic and international conflict may assume a variety of forms. At the core 
of any situation that might prompt efforts at conflict management, however, is 
a political conflict. Political conflicts can occur between two or more groups 
over any objects, tangible or intangible, to which those groups may assign 
value, such as geographical territory, economic and financial resources, politi­
cal standing, identity, religious expression, and so on.
Frequently, political conflicts are dealt with by the groups involved through 
nonviolent means. Indeed, the essential purpose of many political structures 
and processes, both domestically and internationally, is the expression and rec­
onciliation of political differences. Where such political institutions are absent, 
weak, or lack legitimacy, or where the nature of the political conflict is espe­
cially acute, however, the potential exists for the conflict to become violent. 
One side may choose to resort to the use of armed force to achieve its goals, or 
an event may occur that may convince one side that it has been—or will soon 
be—the target of an armed attack and must react accordingly.
Consequently, the focus of this analysis is situations of political conflict in 
which the potential for physical violence is high, if not yet realized. Such con­
flicts may remain peaceful yet potentially violent, they may be ameliorated to 
the point where the potential for violence is low or nonexistent, or they may in­
tensify to the point where violence seems imminent, or what I shall term a “cri­
sis situation.” Once a crisis situation is reached, two outcomes are most likely: 
either a de-escalation of the crisis or the eruption of armed conflict. Militarized 
political conflict may proceed at various levels of violence and destruction and
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for varying lengths of time. Should hostilities cease and the conflict reenter a 
nonviolent phase, the principal possibilities are a renewal of hostilities, a con­
tinuation of tensions just short of organized violence, or a further reduction of 
tension to the point where a more normal situation of political conflict is arrived 
at (see figure 8.1).
Using this typology of conflict situations, one can identify a number of po­
tential goals and corresponding activities for conflict management. These activ­
ities span a wide spectrum ranging from the use of various forms of diplomacy 
through the employment of economic instruments to the direct application of 
military force (see table 8.1).
Military Conflict
Crisis Situation Postmilitary Conflict
Political Conflict
1 i
'
Nonconflict Situation
Figure 8.1. Forms of Conflict
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Table 8.1. Conflict Management Goals and Activities
Stage o f  C onflict C on flic t M anagem ent G oals C on flic t M anagem ent Activities
Political C onflic t (with 
s ign ificant potential 
for arm ed hostilities)
Escalation Prevention 
Am elioration/Tension 
Reduction
Settlement/Resolution
Early W a rn ing : M on ito ring , 
O b se rva tion  
Preventive D ip lom acy: 
Negotiation, M ed iation, 
Arbitration, Conc ilia t ion  
A d jud ication  
M ateria l A ssistance  
C S B M s
Crisis: A cute  
Political Conflict
C ris is  M a na ge m en t 
Prevention o f Hostilities 
De-escalation/Tension 
Reduction
Preventive D ip lo m a c y  
Preventive D ep lo ym en t 
C oe rc ion : Political and  
E con om ic  Sanctions, 
Em bargoes, Threats of Force
M ilita ry  Conflict Conta inm ent
Suppre ssion
Alteration o f Status Q u o
D ip lo m a c y
C oe rc ion
U se  o f Force: Sanction s 
Enforcem ent, D irect 
Intervention
Postm ilitary Conflict Escalation Prevention 
Stabilization/Tension 
Reduction
Rehab i 1 itation/Reconstruction 
Settlement/Resol ution
D ip lo m a c y
C oe rc ion
A rm s  C o n tro l/C SB M s 
M o n ito r in g  
Peacekeep ing 
M ateria l A ssistance  
Adm in istration/Po lic ing 
Political/Legal Institution 
B u ild in g
In the case of political conflict situations involving a significant potential for 
armed violence, the goals of conflict management are to prevent the conflict 
from escalating to a crisis situation and becoming militarized and, ideally, to 
lower the level of tension if not resolve the conflict altogether. To this end, rel­
evant conflict management activities may consist of early warning; preventive 
diplomacy, including such approaches to conflict resolution as mediation, arbi­
tration, and conciliation; and adjudication. Concerned outside parties might 
also employ a range of material and nonmaterial inducements to promote re­
straint in the short term and, ultimately, to lay a foundation for more peaceful 
relations among the local adversaries.
Should a crisis situation in which military hostilities seem imminent occur, the 
goals of conflict management become the prevention of the outbreak of open 
violence and the de-escalation of the crisis. Associated activities may consist of 
renewed efforts at preventive diplomacy, preventive military deployments, and
Regional Conflict Management in Europe 243
coercive actions involving political and economic sanctions, the imposition of 
embargoes, and the threat of force.
In the face of actual armed hostilities, conflict management goals become the 
containment of the fighting, its suppression, and, in some cases, bringing about 
changes in the status quo on the ground. Relevant conflict management activi­
ties may include not only diplomacy and the various forms of coercion de­
scribed above but also the actual use of military force for the purpose of en­
forcing sanctions and direct intervention.
Finally, once the fighting has come to a halt, the goals of conflict manage­
ment shift back to preventing a renewal of hostilities, stabilizing the situation 
and further reducing the level of tension, and possibly rehabilitating damaged 
areas. At such points, an especially wide range of activities may be appropri­
ate. Diplomacy and coercion continue to be relevant. In addition, the estab­
lishment of arms control regimes and confidence- and security-building mea­
sures (CSBMs) may help to limit the potential for violence and rebuild trust. 
Peacekeeping operations can be used to separate warring parties and to mon­
itor and ensure their compliance with any cease-fire agreements. And recon­
struction efforts may require the provision of various forms of assistance and 
even the assumption of administrative and other tasks by third parties.
THE NEED FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT:
REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN EUROPE
The next step in assessing the prospects for successful conflict management in­
volves identifying actual and potential regional conflicts. To do this, one must 
first establish the boundaries of the region in question. Regions are contested 
concepts, and Europe is no exception. To avoid an extended discussion, this 
chapter will simply define Europe as consisting of the those territories located 
east of the Atlantic Ocean, north of the Mediterranean Sea, and west of the Ural 
Mountains and Caspian Sea.4 In addition, the United States and Canada are re­
garded as regional actors, if not European states, in view of their long-standing 
membership in postwar European security organizations.
Within this area, one finds that a high percentage of the actual or potential 
military conflicts are located either in the Balkans or on the territory of the for­
mer Soviet Union (see table 8.2). The remainder of Europe, especially the terri­
tory of those states belonging to NATO or the EU, is virtually free of interstate 
and intrastate political conflicts that could acquire a military dimension in the 
foreseeable future. This skewed geographical distribution has implications for 
actual utility of the institutional capabilities for CCM in the region, as will be dis­
cussed below.
In addition, many of the conflicts of relevance to this study, whether inter­
nal or international in nature, have a significant ethnic basis. They stem from 
the presence within the territory of individual states of two or more distinct
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Table 8.2. Conflicts in Europe
Primary Basis o f Conflict Internal International
Ethnic
Outside FSU Bosnia A lbania-Yugoslavia (Kosovo)
Croatia A lban ia-M acedon ia
Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Vojvodina) Bosnia-Yugoslavia
M acedonia Croatia-Yugoslavia
Turkey Slovenia-Yugoslavia
Hungary-Rom ania
Hungary-Slovakia
Flungary-Ukraine
Turkey-Bulgaria
W ithin FSU M oldova Russia-Estonia
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) Russia-Latvia
Azerbaijan Russia-Ukraine
Russia (Chechnya, etc.) Armenia-Azerbaijan
Non-Ethnic Yugoslavia (Montenegro) Yugoslavia-Macedonia
Albania Macedonia-G reece
Greece-Turkey
and sizable ethnic groups and the existence of some substantial grievance on 
the part of at least one of the groups vis-à-vis the other(s). The precise nature 
of the grievance(s) can vary, but as a result of such grievances, ethnic groups 
may seek greater political autonomy, outright independence, or unification 
with neighboring countries dominated by members of the same nationality.
The following summary description distinguishes between those conflicts 
that are located in the FSU and those elsewhere. As Philip Roeder has noted, 
“the space previously within the Soviet Union now constitutes a distinct inter­
national region.” It also differentiates between those conflicts that have a sig­
nificant ethnic basis and those with other underlying causes.5
Outside the Former Soviet Union
Outside of the former Soviet Union, the most acute ethnic conflicts tend to be 
found on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The recent bloody struggles be­
tween Kosovars (of Albanian ethnicity) and Serbs in Serbia, Croats and Serbs in 
Croatia, and Serbs, Croats, and Muslim Bosniaks in Bosnia are well known. In 
addition, tensions exist between the Hungarian minority and the Serb majority 
in the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina, while those between the Alban­
ian minority (approximately 30 percent of the population) and the Macedonian 
majority in Macedonia were exacerbated by the influx of refugees from Kosovo. 
Outside of the Balkans, violence has long been a common feature of relations 
between Turkey and its Kurdish minority.
Most of these ethnic conflicts also have a significant external dimension. The 
treatment of the Albanian minorities in Serbia and Macedonia has been at the
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center of disputes between Albania and those two countries, respectively.6 Dur­
ing the early 1990s, forces from Serbia were involved in fighting in both Croa­
tia and Bosnia. Hungary has expressed concern about the treatment of ethnic 
Hungarians in not only Serbia but also Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Like­
wise, Turkey has criticized Bulgaria’s treatment of the Turkish minority (eight 
hundred thousand) in that country.7
Not all of the potential domestic and interstate conflicts outside the FSU can 
be said to have primarily ethnic foundations, however. In Albania, the potential 
for violence has been exacerbated by the lack of strong political institutions and 
a weak economy. Montenegro has been rent by a power struggle between 
those who would maintain close ties to Serbia and those favoring an opening 
to the West. On the international side of the ledger, Greece and Turkey have oc­
casionally come close to blows over competing territorial claims in the Aegean, 
and tensions have at times been high between Greece and Macedonia because 
of feared revanchist designs associated with the disputed appropriation of var­
ious cultural symbols.8 Finally, the Bulgarians have never recognized the exis­
tence of a distinct Macedonian nationality, raising the specter of at least an im­
plicit claim to Macedonian territory.9
Before moving on to consider the situation in the FSU, it is important to note 
those once-feared conflicts that have dissipated or that appear to have been ex­
aggerated in some accounts. Perhaps most notable in this regard are the im­
provements in relations that occurred between united Germany and its immedi­
ate eastern neighbors, Poland and the Czech Republic, during the 1990s. 
Although not all outstanding issues have been resolved and some bitter feelings 
remain, armed conflict between these states is unimaginable today. Likewise, 
significant progress has been made toward a resolution of the problems created 
by the Hungarian diaspora, especially the Hungarian minority in Romania (Tran­
sylvania).10 And even parts of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia and increasingly 
Croatia, have become remarkably stable over the course of the last decade.
Within the Former Soviet Union
A comparable number of violent and potentially violent political conflicts can 
be found on the territory of the former Soviet Union. This state of affairs should 
come as no surprise, given that the Soviet Union employed repressive measures 
to weld together a plethora of nationalities and afforded them few opportuni­
ties for meaningful self-expression or self-determination for more than half a 
century, notwithstanding pretenses to the contrary. These conflicts can be 
roughly grouped into four subregional categories.
The first concerns relations between Russia and the Baltic states, especially 
Estonia and Latvia. Russia has been at odds with its much smaller northwestern 
neighbors to varying degrees over borders, military basing rights, and, most im­
portantly, the treatment and status of ethnic Russians, who have constituted 
roughly 30 percent of the populations of Estonia and Latvia."
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The situation of ethnic Russian minorities has also burdened Russian rela­
tions with several other former Soviet republics, most notably Ukraine and 
Moldova. In the former, the problems created by the presence of some eleven 
million Russians have been compounded by the concentration of many of 
them in industrial regions that border Russian territory and Russian claims to 
the Crimea, which was transferred by Russia to Ukraine in the 1950s and con­
tains a substantial presence of ethnic Russians. In Moldova, the geographically 
concentrated Russian minority has even attempted to establish an independent 
republic, which has nevertheless failed thus far to garner international recog­
nition.12
Most of the violent conflicts on the territory of the FSU have taken place in 
the Caucasus region. The territorial integrity of Georgia has been forcibly chal­
lenged by armed, ethnically based secessionist movements in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. Nearby, Azerbaijan has been engaged in a violent struggle with 
separatist ethnic Armenians in the province of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has in 
turn strained relations between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia.
Finally, Russia faces severe internal ethnic troubles of its own. The most 
prominent of these are also to be found in the Caucasus, where Russia has al­
ready waged two expensive wars in Chechnya in less than a decade. Neverthe­
less, a real potential for violent, ethnic conflict exists in a number of other parts 
of the country as well, such as Tartarstan, where long-suppressed national mi­
norities strive for greater autonomy if not outright political independence.13
INCENTIVES FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
What incentives might other states in the region possess for seeking to manage 
these conflicts? After all, even if potentially violent conflicts exist, those not di­
rectly involved will be disinclined to engage in conflict management efforts if 
they have no compelling interest to do so, in view of the risks and costs. And 
as Richard Ullman convincingly argued a decade ago, the stakes that the more 
stable countries of western and central Europe have in other parts of the region 
are lower than ever.14
Nevertheless, the incentives for conflict management in Europe are not neg­
ligible and, indeed, have been sufficient to prompt numerous efforts at CCM, in­
cluding military operations of substantial magnitude, since the end of the Cold 
War. The strength of these incentives will vary, however, depending upon the 
precise nature and location of the conflict. As Joseph Lepgold has noted, more­
over, even where significant incentives exist, states may be inhibited from tak­
ing strong action because of the collective action problems associated with 
peace operations.15
In the case of conflicts outside the FSU, especially in southeastern Europe, 
one important incentive is the danger that a violent conflict, if unaddressed, will 
spread to adjoining territories through a process of spillover, the uncoordinated
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intervention of outside parties, or both. A second incentive follows from the be­
lief that the illegitimate resort to arms should not go unpunished, as it may oth­
erwise encourage disgruntled groups located elsewhere to use violence if they 
believe that it promises success and that they can act with impunity. A some­
what more self-interested consideration is that large-scale violence can gener­
ate equally large-scale outflows of refugees. In the early 1990s, for example, 
over eight hundred thousand Bosnians alone sought refuge in other European 
states, including more than four hundred thousand in Germany,16 while at the 
end of the decade, nearly a quarter million Kosovars fled to neighboring Mace­
donia. Nor, as Western governments have learned in Bosnia and Kosovo, do the 
material costs stop mounting when the fighting comes to an end. Outside par­
ties interested in preventing a renewal of violent conflict may have to consider 
making substantial financial contributions to the process of reconstruction over 
a prolonged period.
At the same time, one should not discount the significance of purely human­
itarian motives to protect the innocent and to minimize the suffering of peoples 
affected by conflict. In an age when the various media provide a steady stream 
of stories about and images of the consequences of violence, most citizens in 
the advanced industrial countries of Europe no longer have the luxury of being 
able to remain ignorant of military depredations taking place on their continent. 
Thus even where the material stakes have appeared to be low, Western gov­
ernments have come under considerable public pressure to do something to 
stem the violence.
As a general rule, the incentives that the states of western and central Europe, 
not to mention those of North America, have to take action are not as great 
when it comes to conflicts within the FSU. The level of humanitarian concern 
may be equally high. But because such conflicts are further removed geo­
graphically, these states are much less likely to be affected directly or indirectly, 
except where a conflict threatens to destabilize Russia or to reverse the hard- 
won democratic advances that have been made there. Conversely, the costs and 
risks of involvement are likely to be higher, especially where it might put them 
at odds with Russia.
The risk of serious tensions over conflict management strategies is not negli­
gible, given that Russia is itself a party to many of the conflicts in the FSU and 
that, even where it is not, Russian incentives for intervention are arguably 
broader and potentially inconsistent. Beyond those incentives shared with the 
other states in the region, such as preventing spillover effects, they include Rus­
sia’s determination to remain a major player in all aspects of European security 
affairs, notwithstanding its current economic and political weaknesses. And in 
those areas that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, such as the Transcau- 
casus, Russia’s motives may extend to a desire to retain or reestablish a signifi­
cant degree of hegemonic influence.17 Needless to say, such goals may at times 
result in Russian actions that run counter to traditional conflict management 
prescriptions.18 They also complicate Western calculations of how to proceed,
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given the understandable desire to maintain good working relations with Rus­
sia on a range of other important issues.
In sum, both outside and within the FSU, the precise nature and strength of 
the incentives to engage in CCM will vary from state to state and from conflict 
to conflict, but they will rarely be entirely absent. The more practical question 
concerns the point at which they will be sufficiently strong to prompt action. In 
particular, will outsiders see fit to intervene early enough or in the most effec­
tive manner? The answer to this question depends, in part, on the tools avail­
able for CCM, to which I now turn.
INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR 
COLLECTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE
With the partial exception of Russia, the principal actors in the region are likely 
to engage in conflict management activities only collectively through existing 
multilateral security institutions. Europe possesses a set of relatively highly de­
veloped institutional capabilities of potential use for CCM. Most of these capa­
bilities are lodged in a variety of regional organizations, the most important of 
which are the OSCE, NATO, and the EU/WEU. In the discussion that follows, I 
shall refer to such bodies as regional conflict management organizations 
(RCMO).
Needless to say, given their diverse origins, purposes, and memberships, 
these organizations differ considerably in terms of their potential CCM capabil­
ities. The OSCE is the only truly pan-regional organization. NATO and the 
EU/WEU have restricted memberships but are of potentially great relevance to 
CCM efforts beyond the territory of their members. Yet other RCMOs, like the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), are confined in both their mem­
bership and activities to particular subregions.
All, however, have evolved considerably during the past decade and will 
probably continue to do so. Thus the overall picture is very much a work in 
progress. Nevertheless, the situation has probably stabilized enough that it is 
possible to provide a description and comparative analysis of these organiza­
tional capacities that will not immediately become obsolete. This analysis will 
consider each of the following relevant organizational characteristics:
1. membership and, where it may differ, geographical area of responsibility 
(see table 8.3)
2. functional mandate
3- decision-making process
4. organizational capabilities and resources (see table 8.4).
With regard to the fourth characteristic, it should be emphasized that the inter­
est of this study lies in the assets possessed by the organizations themselves
Table 8.3. Membership in European Conflict Management Organizations
EU
N ATO PFP
W EU C IS O ther O SC E
C an ad a D en m ark Be lg ium Austria A rm en ia A lb an ia A ndorra
C ze c h  Repub lic Britain Fin land A zerba ijan Bu lgaria Bo sn ia
H u n g a ry France Ire land Belarus Estonia Croatia
Ice land G e rm an y Sw eden G eorg ia Latvia C yp ru s
N o rw a y G reece M o ld o va Lithuania H o ly  See
Poland Italy Russia M a c e d o n ia Liechtenstein
Turkey Luxem bou rg U kra ine Rom an ia M a lta
U nited  States Netherlands S lovakia M o n a c o
Portugal Sloven ia San M a r in o
Spa in Sw itzerland Yugoslav ia
Note: This table excludes the five Central Asian republics.
Table 8.4. Crisis Management Capabilities and Resources by Organization
O SC E N ATO EU /W EU Others
Political conflict H C N M
O D IH R
C ourt o f C onc ilia t ion  
and  Arbitration 
M is s io n s
Personal representatives 
C P C
F SC  (arm s control, C S B M s )
PFP
E A P C
Secretary-General/IS
Satellite Center 
(early w arn ing) 
H um an itarian  O ffice  
M o n ito r in g  m ission s
U N  (preventive deploym ent, 
preventive d ip lom acy)
C r is is  situation C P C IM S  (sanctions enforcem ent) U N  (m ediation, sanctions)
M ilita ry  conflict M is s io n s  (sanctions assistance) IM S  (sanctions, threats of 
force, use o f force)
M ilita ry  staff (peace m aking) U N  (m ediation, sanctions, 
m andate to use force)
Postm ilitary conflict M is s io n s  (Bosnia,
Croatia, Kosovo)
C P C  (peacekeeping)
F S C  (arms control, C S B M s )
IM S/PFP  (peacekeeping) M ilita ry  staff 
(peacekeeping)
Satellite Center
(m onitoring, verification) 
H um an ita rian  O ffice  
A g e n c y  for Reconstruction 
M o n ito r in g  m ission s
U N  (m onitoring, 
peacekeeping, 
adm inistration) 
C IS  (peacekeeping)
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rather than the national resources of their members. Nevertheless, the two may 
be closely related insofar as one purpose of the former is to facilitate and en­
sure the efficient use of the latter.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
The OSCE is the most comprehensive, both geographically and functionally, 
of the RCMOs in Europe. All states in the region are eligible for membership, and 
in fact virtually all European states are members.19 Correspondingly, the OSCE 
possesses a standing mandate to address conflicts throughout the region, subject 
to decision-making constraints. The OSCE is the only RCMO in Europe that is 
considered a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
At the same time, the OSCE has a very broad mandate with regard to conflict 
management. Its various decision-making bodies can authorize a wide variety of 
measures. These include short-term fact-finding and rapporteur missions, long­
term in-country missions that may serve several purposes (sanctions assistance, 
monitoring and verification, etc.), personal representatives of the Chairman-in- 
Office (CiO), and additional measures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
Furthermore, the OSCE may undertake peacekeeping activities, although this 
option has not yet been exercised. Nevertheless, the mandate of the OSCE is ori­
ented much more toward the goals of dispute resolution, early warning, escala­
tion prevention, and crisis management rather than dealing with actual military 
hostilities. In particular, it lacks any explicit authority to call for the employment 
of coercive measures, such as economic sanctions and the use of military force, 
by its members.20
A further limitation of the OSCE is the cumbersome nature of its decision­
making process. In principle, all of its decision-making and negotiating bodies 
operate by consensus, which “is understood to mean the absence of any ob­
jection expressed by a participating State to the taking of the decision in ques­
tion.”21 This requirement might not be so onerous but for the large and diverse 
nature of the OSCE membership and the resulting divergence of interests. In ad­
dition, decisions of the organization are not legally binding.
Nevertheless, the OSCE has, over the past decade, developed several excep­
tions to the consensus rule that enhance its abilities to address conflicts in the 
region. Under the “consensus-minus-one” principle, actions can be taken with­
out the consent of the state concerned in “cases of clear, gross and uncorrected 
violation” of OSCE commitments. This mechanism was used to suspend Yu­
goslavia’s membership in 1992. Under the “consensus-minus-two” rule, the 
Ministerial Council can instruct two participating states that are involved in a 
dispute to seek conciliation, even if the participating states object to the deci­
sion, although this option has not yet been made use of. And the Chairman-in- 
Office may designate personal representatives on his or her own responsibility.
In addition, the OSCE had developed a variety of additional mechanism and 
procedures that are intended, in cases requiring rapid action, to facilitate
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prompt and direct contact between the parties involved in a conflict and the 
mobilization of concerted action by the OSCE. The “Vienna Mechanism” obliges 
states to respond to requests for information relating to human dimension obli­
gations and to hold bilateral meetings when requested. The “Moscow Mecha­
nism” allows a group of six or more states to initiate the dispatch of a mission 
of experts to assist a state in the resolution of a particular question or problem 
relating to the human dimension.22 The “Mechanism for Consultation and Co­
operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities” obliges states to provide in­
formation regarding any unusual and unscheduled activities of their military 
forces when requested. And several other mechanisms were rendered super­
fluous by the establishment in 1993 of the Permanent Council of national rep­
resentatives, which can meet on short notice.
To support its various conflict management activities, the OSCE has developed 
a number of distinct capabilities and resources since the end of the Cold War. Per­
haps the most important of these is the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), which 
is responsible for overall support for the implementation of OSCE tasks in the 
fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and postconflict 
rehabilitation, and for daily follow-up and liaison for the execution of OSCE de­
cisions. Since 1999, the CPC has maintained an Operations Centre to identify po­
tential crisis areas and to plan for future missions and operations. Nevertheless, 
given the small size of the CPC, the OSCE’s ability to prepare and support peace­
keeping operations in particular remains highly limited at this point.
Several other structures also merit mention. The High Commissioner on Na­
tional Minorities (HCNM) functions as an instrument of preventive diplomacy. 
The HCNM aims to identify—and promote the early resolution of—ethnic ten­
sions that have the potential to endanger peace, stability, or friendly relations 
between the participating states of the OSCE. The Office of Democratic Institu­
tions and Human Rights (ODIHR) contributes to early warning and conflict pre­
vention, in particular by monitoring the implementation of human dimension 
commitments. And states may submit disputes to the OSCE-related Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration, whose final decisions are legally binding, although 
not all OSCE states are parties to the convention establishing the Court and the 
Court has not yet been used.
Somewhere between a decision-making body and an organizational capabil­
ity is the multipurpose Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Its main objec­
tives include conducting negotiations on arms control, disarmament, and con­
fidence- and security-building and holding regular consultations and intensive 
cooperation on matters relating to security. The FSC is also responsible for the 
implementation of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), the 
holding of Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings, the provision of a fo­
rum for discussing and clarifying information exchanged under agreed upon 
CSBMs, and the preparation of seminars on military doctrine. Among its 
achievements have been the negotiation of a CSBM regime for Bosnia and a 
subregional arms control agreement for much of the former Yugoslavia.
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
NATO, which dates back to 1949, is the oldest of the European organizations 
with significant CCM capabilities. It is also arguably the one whose security 
functions have changed the most over the years. In sharp contrast to the OSCE, 
NATO began as a traditional alliance with a primary focus on the protection of 
its members against external threats. Only in the 1990s did it acquire explicit 
conflict management responsibilities. As a result of this rather different life his­
tory, many of the areas in which the OSCE is weakest are those in which NATO 
is strongest, and vice versa.
Unlike the case of the OSCE, membership in NATO is restricted. The existing 
members may chose to invite other states to join the organization, but there are 
no explicit criteria for membership. Currently, NATO has nineteen members.23
Nevertheless, NATO involves a number of other states in its activities 
through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (which supplanted the North At­
lantic Cooperation Council in 1997) and, especially, its Partnership for Peace 
(PFP) program. Participation in the PFP is based on agreements negotiated be­
tween individual countries and NATO regarding the scope, pace, and level of 
joint activities in which they would like to engage. Currently, some twenty- 
seven additional states have established cooperative programs with NATO un­
der the PFP.
The North Atlantic Treaty was carefully worded to ensure that members’ ob­
ligations to one another did not extend beyond their territories in Europe and 
North America (with the exception of attacks on member forces located in the 
Mediterranean and North Atlantic). At the same time, however, the Treaty does 
not prohibit the members from acting collectively outside this so-called North 
Atlantic Area, should they wish to do so. In addition, under the terms of the PFP, 
NATO is obliged to consult with any active participant if that state perceives a 
direct threat to its security.
One consequence of NATO’s restricted membership is that its decisions do 
not automatically command legitimacy in areas outside those covered by the 
treaty. As a result, members are typically—but not always, as evidenced in 
Kosovo—reluctant to act collectively “out of area” in the absence of an explicit 
mandate from the United Nations or the OSCE. In practical terms, this means 
that the use of NATO for CCM activities is highly unlikely on the territory of the 
former Soviet Union and, especially, in Russia proper.
During the Cold War, NATO’s formal mandate focused on the closely related 
tasks of deterring military attacks on its members and defending them should 
an attack nevertheless occur. Since the end of the Cold War, this mandate has 
been considerably broadened and now includes explicitly the functions of 
“conflict prevention and crisis management.” The alliance’s most recent strate­
gic concept, adopted in 1999, notes the possibility of conducting “crisis re­
sponse operations” such as those that have been carried out in the Balkans and 
reiterates NATO’s offer to support “peacekeeping and other operations under
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the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, in­
cluding by making available Alliance resources and expertise.”24
Although the strategic concept is less explicit on this point, it also envisages a 
variety of activities intended to ameliorate or even resolve political conflicts. 
Through the “active pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue” with non­
members, NATO aims “to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead 
to instability and conflict.” This task complements the alliance’s long-standing (at 
least since the admission of Germany in 1955), if always implicit, function of de­
fusing political conflict among its members by increasing transparency, promot­
ing military interdependence, and perpetuating U.S. involvement in European se­
curity affairs.25
Like the OSCE, NATO acts on the basis of consensus. This requirement means 
that decision making on contentious issues, such as those often associated with 
conflict management, can be slow and difficult.
For several reasons, however, consensus is generally easier to attain in 
NATO than in the OSCE. Most obviously, the achievement of consensus is fa­
cilitated by NATO’s smaller membership. Perhaps even more important is the 
fact that, as a general rule, the interests of NATO countries are more closely 
aligned with one another than are those of OSCE members, which is a conse­
quence of the alliance’s restricted membership. A third factor is the large num­
ber of well-exercised bodies and procedures for timely consultation and the 
exchange of information. In addition, deliberation within the North Atlantic 
Council, the alliance’s highest-level decision-making body, can be expedited 
by the presence of a strong secretary-general, who can use his authority to pro­
pose and broker compromises in cases where the membership is divided.26 Fi­
nally, in some instances, the existence of a dominant member, the United 
States, has helped to overcome differences where it has been willing to lead.
NATO’s most distinctive organizational asset for carrying out crisis manage­
ment activities is its integrated military planning and command structure and as­
sociated multilateral military assets, such as the NATO Airborne Early Warning 
Force. When supplemented by PFP-related bodies, especially the Partnership 
Coordination Cell, the integrated military structure (IMS) gready facilitates the 
collective deployment and use of military forces by NATO members and part­
ner countries. Even as it has been considerably streamlined since the end of the 
Cold War, this structure has developed the ability to orchestrate out-of-area 
multilateral military operations of substantial size and complexity, as evidenced 
by the various NATO actions in the Balkans. Consequently, NATO remains the 
RCMO best positioned to engage in the enforcement of sanctions, peacekeep­
ing, direct intervention, and other types of military operations.
The principal question that has arisen regarding the utility of the IMS con­
cerns possible instances in which one or more members might wish not to par­
ticipate in a proposed joint military operation outside the NATO area. During 
the Cold War, the military structure made no provisions for less than unanimous 
engagement in defense operations by participating states, reflecting the near
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water-tight obligation to provide assistance contained in Article 5 of the treaty. 
Many now imaginable out-of-area conflict management activities would carry 
no such obligation, however. To address this potential problem, the alliance has 
developed and begun to implement the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces 
(CJTF), which is intended to allow “coalitions of the willing” to draw upon 
NATO headquarters and other military assets in order to engage in nondefense 
actions, as long as no member expresses an objection to them.
In contrast to the OSCE, NATO’s organizational capabilities for nonmilitary 
aspects of conflict management are much less well articulated. Nevertheless, a 
substantial reservoir of such capabilities is inherent in the large International 
Staff (IS) maintained by the alliance in Brussels. In particular, the NATO secre­
tary-general possesses the stature and authority to serve as an effective inter­
mediary, as evidenced in Macedonia in 2001.
European Union (EU)/Western European Union (WEU)
The EU and the WEU were originally distinct organizations. During the past 
decade, however, they have drawn ever closer together, especially with regard 
to potential activities in the area of crisis management. Consequently, it is nec­
essary to consider them together for the purposes of this chapter.
Currently, the EU and WEU are the least developed of all the major European 
security institutions as RCMOs. In particular, their dedicated organizational ca­
pabilities and resources for engaging in conflict management activities are less 
substantial than those of either the OSCE or NATO at the moment. Nevertheless, 
this situation is very much in flux, as the EU has recently launched an unprece­
dented effort to develop a capacity to conduct military missions in response to 
international crises. In view of the EU’s success in other fields of international 
cooperation, its potential to become a leading, if not the leading, regional or­
ganization in the field of conflict management is considerable, although it is too 
early to discern clearly how far the EU will actually proceed along this path and 
the form that it will eventually take.
Like NATO, both the EU and the WEU have restricted memberships. There is 
much overlap among the three organizations. Of the current fifteen EU mem­
bers, eleven also belong to NATO and the other four participate in the PFP. All 
ten present WEU members are in both NATO and the EU.27
At the moment, it is arguably more difficult for former Soviet bloc states to 
join the EU (and, by extension, the WEU) than NATO because of the significant 
economic ramifications of membership in the former. Nevertheless, beginning 
in the 1990s, the WEU has sought to work as closely as possible with non­
members, creating the categories of Associate Member (for European NATO 
members not in the EU), Associate Partner (for states in neither NATO nor tire 
EU), and Observer. Likewise, the EU has recently indicated its desire to involve 
nonmembers to “the fullest possible extent” in EU-led crisis management activ­
ities, although concrete arrangements have yet to be devised.28
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Neither the Treaty on European Union (TEU) nor the modified Brussels 
Treaty on which the WEU is based establishes a clear geographical area of re­
sponsibility. Nevertheless, the implications of recent decisions are that both or­
ganizations regard a wide range of foreign, security, and defense policy activi­
ties beyond the territory of their members as falling within their competence.
Within this broad mandate, what specific types of conflict management ac­
tivities are envisioned? The original Brussels Treaty of 1948 was concerned with 
the defense of its signatories against attack, but this function was assumed by 
NATO in the mid-1950s. In 1987, however, WEU leaders called for concerted 
policies toward crises outside of Europe, paving the way for the dispatch of a 
small WEU naval contingent to the Persian Gulf. And in 1992, they articulated a 
detailed set of military actions, collectively known as the “Petersberg tasks,” for 
which their forces might be used: humanitarian and rescue missions, peace­
keeping operations, and the use of combat forces in crisis management, in­
cluding peacemaking.29 The following month, the WEU approved the deploy­
ment of a naval task force to the Adriatic to monitor the UN arms embargo 
against former Yugoslavia.
Although its origins date back to the 1950s, the EU did not acquire broad 
competence in the area of security and defense, as part of a common foreign 
and security policy, until the formulation and ratification of the TEU (commonly 
known as the Maastricht Treaty) in the early 1990s. Further amendments, con­
tained in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, explicitly identified the Petersberg tasks 
as part of the EU mandate in this area, setting the stage for a process whereby 
the EU will assume all WEU functions except that of collective defense. More 
recently, the European Council, the EU’s highest-level decision-making body, 
has frequently emphasized the importance of the EU’s tasks in the field of con­
flict prevention and crisis management. In fact, the EU has already been very 
active since the early 1990s in attempting to resolve regional political conflicts, 
prevent their escalation, and stabilize and reconstruct war-torn areas.
As with NATO, WEU decisions are made on the basis of consensus. Whether 
consensus is any easier (because of its smaller membership) or difficult (be­
cause of the lack of a dominant power) to achieve in the WEU than in NATO 
on weighty issues is difficult to ascertain, given that the WEU has been used rel­
atively infrequently and in much more limited ways.
The situation in the EU is more complicated. Initially, the TEU required that 
substantive decisions regarding the common foreign and security policy be 
made unanimously, except where it had been previously agreed to act on the 
basis of a qualified majority. The Amsterdam Treaty, however, established a 
more differentiated process. In principle, the Council would act unanimously 
when making decisions. However, one or more members could abstain with­
out preventing the adoption of a decision by the others.
Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the option of “qualified absten­
tion,” involving a formal declaration, whereby the abstaining party would not be 
obliged to apply the decision even as it accepted that the decision committed the
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EU as a whole. Only if the members qualifying their abstention represented 
more than one third of the weighted votes would a decision not be adopted. 
Nevertheless, a single country could still block the adoption of a decision by ex­
plicitly opposing it, and this novel procedure does not apply to decisions having 
military or defense implications.
More recently, the EU has created new political and military bodies within the 
European Council to facilitate effective and timely decision making during the 
conduct of military crisis management operations. A standing Political and Se­
curity Committee (PSC) consisting of national representatives will exercise, un­
der the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of 
such operations. In addition, a Military Committee (MC) has been established to 
provide military advice and make recommendations to the PSC.
The principal limitations of the EU and WEU with regard to their potential use 
for conflict management lie in the area of organizational capabilities and re­
sources. Thus far, the EU has relied primarily on the European Commission, its 
executive organ, to support nonmilitary crisis management activities. Given its 
size and resources, the Commission has a great capacity to coordinate diplo­
matic efforts, observer missions, economic assistance, sanctions, and other 
measures. Nevertheless, the EU has created few dedicated assets to implement 
its decisions, and these have tended to be ad hoc bodies with country-specific 
mandates, such as the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) in the 
former Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Task Force, and the European Agency for Re­
construction.30
This situation may see significant change in the near future, however. The EU 
presidency concluded its work in 1999 with a call for the development of a 
“rapid reaction capability in the field of crisis management using nonmilitary 
means.” Among the elements envisioned for such a capability were an inven­
tory of relevant national and collective personnel, material, and financial re­
sources, a coordinating mechanism within the Secretariat of the Council of Min­
isters, and rapid financing mechanisms, such as a Rapid Reaction Fund.31 In 
addition, the recently created office of High Representative for the EU in the 
area of foreign and security policy provides a potentially useful focal point for 
preventive diplomacy and crisis management activities.32
On the military side, the primary crisis management capabilities have resided 
until recently in the WEU, which established a small planning cell (subse­
quently renamed the Military Staff) and a satellite data interpretation center in 
the early to mid-1990s. Nevertheless, the WEU possesses no forces or perma­
nent command structures of its own and relies instead on NATO or individual 
countries to provide them on a case-by-case basis.
The organizational resources of the EU have been even more limited. It was 
not until 1999 that the EU made it a priority to acquire a capacity for autonomous 
action, including the launching and conduct of EU-led military missions, in re­
sponse to international crises. Particular importance was assigned to the rein­
forcement of EU capabilities in the fields of intelligence, strategic transport, and
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command and control. In addition, the EU agreed to create a new Military Staff 
within the Council that would provide military expertise and support, and per­
form early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for Petersberg 
tasks. The ultimate goal is to be able to deploy within sixty days and sustain for 
at least one year military forces of up to fifty to sixty thousand persons.
The principal challenge facing the EU in the development of such a capacity 
is the expressed need to do so “without unnecessary duplication” of NATO as­
sets. Consequently, emphasis has been placed on developing more effective 
European military capabilities on the basis of existing “national, binational, and 
multinational capabilities.” The presence of this constraint suggests that the EU 
will continue to rely heavily on the use of NATO resources and capabilities, 
should they be available, to mount operations of any significant size for the 
foreseeable future.
Other Regional Conflict Management Bodies
This survey does not exhaust the list of bodies that have made a contribution 
to conflict management in the region or could do so in the future. One of these 
is the Contact Group, which has been used to good effect in Bosnia.33 In fact, 
the Contact Group is not a formal organization but rather an informal mecha­
nism for coordinating the policy of a handful of major powers: the United 
States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Italy. As such, it might be viewed 
as an emergent regional security council, although it has thus far confined itself 
to addressing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
This arrangement results in both significant advantages and limitations in 
comparison with other RCMOs. On the one hand, the small size of its member­
ship, the lack of formal procedures, and the possibility of secrecy may facilitate 
the reaching of agreements in a timely manner, while the identity of its mem­
bers ensures that any agreements will be backed by significant national re­
sources. On the other hand, the exclusion of other countries may generate hard 
feelings and cast doubt on the broader legitimacy of any agreed actions, at least 
until they are considered in other organizational fora. In addition, the Contact 
Group possesses no capabilities of its own. Consequently, it seems likely that it 
will be used only sporadically and as a complement to other organizations.
Europe also features several subregional security organizations, the most im­
portant of which is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS 
was hastily established at the end of 1991 as part of the process by which the 
USSR was dissolved. Originally consisting of eleven of the fifteen former Soviet 
republics,34 it was initially given only a very limited organizational structure and 
no formal authority in the area of security, reflecting the reluctance of most of 
its members to create any powerful institutions that could threaten their new­
found sovereignty. The highly restricted institutional design was supplemented 
in 1993 by a Charter that provided for policy coordination and joint consulta­
tion in security and defense policy and created a council of foreign ministers
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and a council of defense ministers. It also established a High Command of the 
United Armed Forces that could exercise control over groups of military ob­
servers and collective peacekeeping forces. Nevertheless, only seven of the 
eleven original members signed the Charter, greatly limiting its potential appli­
cation.35 In fact, the CIS has been employed for the purpose of conflict man­
agement only once so far, and then only to give international legitimacy to a 
Russian peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia. As Neil MacFarlane concludes, 
“to the extent that [the CIS] serves any purpose, it is as an instrument of Russian 
foreign policy in the former Soviet space.”36
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Before assessing the adequacy of these bodies for regional crisis management, 
it is necessary to consider the role of the United Nations (UN). Not only is the 
UN the principal extraregional institution of relevance, but it is also the main ve­
hicle for involvement by potentially interested nonregional powers, notably 
China by virtue of its status as a permanent member of the Security Council. 
During the Cold War, the UN was rarely called upon to promote security in Eu­
rope. That task fell almost exclusively to the opposing alliance systems and, 
later, the CSCE. Since 1990, however, the global body has been pressed into ser­
vice on numerous occasions as a substitute for or complement to regional or­
ganizations attempting to deal with conflicts on the continent.
There is no need to review the UN’s membership and geographical area of 
responsibility, functional mandate, decision-making procedures, and organiza­
tional capabilities and resources, all of which are well known. For the purposes 
of this chapter, it will suffice to describe the ways it has been used in Europe 
during the past decade. These uses fall into four broad categories, reflecting the 
organization’s comprehensive authority.
First, in areas characterized by active hostilities, the UN—or, more accurately, 
the Security Council—has been the principal author of international sanctions 
on combatants, most notably in the former Yugoslavia. There, it has variously 
established an arms embargo, a comprehensive trade embargo, a no-fly zone, 
safe areas, and heavy weapons exclusion zones. Where the deployment and 
use of military forces has been deemed necessary to enforce these sanctions, 
the Security Council has provided mandates to NATO and other regional or­
ganizations.
Second, the UN has sponsored peacekeeping operations, preventive military 
deployments, and observer missions intended to prevent the outbreak or a re­
newal of hostilities in areas characterized by high levels of tension. In some 
cases, such as Croatia and Macedonia, these activities have been carried out by 
traditional “blue helmet” forces. In Bosnia and Kosovo, however, where the 
military requirements of the mission were expected to be high, the UN has 
turned responsibility for implementation over to NATO.
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Third, the UN has played an important role in postconflict political and eco­
nomic rehabilitation. In Kosovo, for example, the UN has assumed overall au­
thority as well as day-to-day responsibility for the civilian administration of that 
war-torn province. Finally, at various stages in several conflicts, the UN has 
used diplomacy to prevent the escalation of violence and to assist with the 
search for peaceful solutions.
EVALUATION: THE PROSPECTS FOR 
SUCCESSFUL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
This survey finds that Europe possesses an abundance of institutional capabili­
ties for collective conflict management, many of which reside in three sets of or­
ganizations: the OSCE, NATO, and the EU/WEU. Moreover, these capabilities 
are quite diverse in nature, corresponding to the full range of potentially desir­
able crisis management activities identified above (table 8.4). Thus, on paper at 
least, the overall potential for successful conflict management in Europe seems 
quite high.
Two additional observations lend further credence to this general conclu­
sion. The first is that these capabilities are not simply the result of abstract spec­
ulation about what might be desirable. Rather, they have been developed 
largely in response to the need to address specific recent conflicts in the region, 
suggesting their relevance to likely future conflicts as well. The second and re­
lated observation is that many of these capabilities have been tested in a num­
ber of conflict situations during the past decade, to increasingly (although not 
always) good effect.
The 1990s witnessed multiple cycles in which regional conflicts elicited the 
development of new organizational capabilities, which were then employed 
and, where necessary, modified to increase their effectiveness. Through such a 
process, for example, the ability of the OSCE to plan, deploy, and support long­
term missions has been greatly enhanced. Likewise, NATO, in response to ex­
ternal pressures, has made the transition in but a decade from a military organi­
zation designed only for deterrence and defense to one that can mount 
collective enforcement and peacekeeping operations of unprecedented size and 
intensity. In fact, NATO has supplanted the UN as the principal source of peace­
keeping forces in the region. Although the EU has evolved perhaps the most 
slowly of the major regional organizations, it has departed the furthest from its 
original purposes, as witnessed by its recent efforts to develop a military capa­
bility of its own and to promote stability in Southeastern Europe. And one body, 
the Contact Group, owes its very existence to post-Cold War regional conflicts, 
although the limits of its usefulness were also made clear by the deep divisions 
among its members that arose over the handling of the Kosovo crisis.
To be sure, one can point to numerous instances in which one or more Eu­
ropean RCMOs proved ineffective or inadequate for the conflict management
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task at hand. Indeed, there has probably been no occasion on which a regional 
organization has performed flawlessly or achieved all of the goals set for it. The 
more important point, however, is that these CCM capabilities have evolved 
considerably over time largely in response to their perceived shortcomings and 
failures. Consequently, the past performance of European RCMOs provides lit­
tle basis for assessing the future prospects for successful conflict management, 
although the overall trend—from the EU’s unsuccessful diplomacy as Yu­
goslavia dissolved in 1991 to NATO’s forceful intervention in Kosovo at the end 
of the decade—seems positive.
Within the Former Soviet Union
Nevertheless, the availability and potential effectiveness of these CCM capa­
bilities varies considerably depending on the location of the conflict (see table 
8.5). The prospects for successful CCM are dimmest within the FSU, where the 
involvement of RCMOs is highly dependent upon the approval of Russia. As a 
result, NATO and the EU/WEU are unlikely to be called upon to address con­
flict in the region because of Russian mistrust of the Western powers that dom­
inate them. And even though the mandate of the OSCE extends throughout Eu­
rope, the nature and degree of that organization’s involvement in the FSU also 
remains hostage to Russian policy.
As a general rule, Russia will probably prefer to act alone, or at least without 
external constraints, within the former Soviet space and especially on its own
Table 8.5. Organizational Conflict Management Capabilities by Region
A ctiv ity O utside  FSU Inside FSU
Early w arn ing: m onitoring, O S C E  (H C N M ,  O D IH R ) ,  EU O SC E , U N
observation (satellite center,humanitarian 
office, m on itoring  m issions)
O SC E , U NPreventive d ip lom acy  and O S C E  (H C N M ,  LT m issions), EU
crisis d ip lom acy (H iRep), Contact C roup, U N
Adjud ication O S C E
Preventive dep loym ents U N ,  N A T O , O S C E
Coercion: sanctions U N ,  O S C E , EU
Coercion: m ilitary threats U N ,  N A T O  (IM S), W E U
U se  of force: sanctions N A T O  (IM S), W E U
enforcem ent
U se  of force: direct N A T O  (IM S)
intervention
Peacekeeping U N ,  N A T O  (IM S, PFP), EU, O S C E C IS
A rm s con tro l/C SBM s O S C E  (FSC), EU  (satellite center)
Econom ic  and  technical U N ,  O S C E ,  EU  (Agency for
assistance Reconstruction, m onitoring m issions)
C ivil adm inistration/policing U N ,  E U A V E U
O S C E
Institution bu ild in g EU, U N
262 John S. Duffield
territory. Russia acted on its own initiative to address the conflicts in Georgia 
and Moldova, eventually sending forces to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
(The latter deployment was later authorized as a regional peacekeeping opera­
tion by the CIS, although it continued to be manned and financed exclusively 
by Russia.)37 And in Chechnya, it has strongly resisted even the most limited 
proposals by the OSCE and the Council of Europe to dispatch small numbers of 
observers. To make matters worse, Russia may sometimes have an interest in 
exploiting ethnic divisions in the former Soviet republics in order to enhance its 
influence in those states.
In some cases, Russia may be willing to allow the involvement of the OSCE 
and the UN where doing so appears to advance its own interests. In the Baltics, 
the OSCE proved useful in ensuring that the interests of Russian minorities were 
protected. And Russia was able to secure the approval of the UN Security Coun­
cil for the peacekeeping force that it had already deployed in Abkhazia, thereby 
legitimating its actions, although it was unsuccessful in obtaining external fi­
nancing for the operation.
Russia’s relationship with these organizations has not been entirely one­
sided, however. In several ways, OSCE involvement in the Baltic worked in fa­
vor of Estonia and Lithuania, and the resolution of the conflicts there will cer­
tainly reduce Russia’s influence in the long term.38 In return for UN and OSCE 
support in Georgia, moreover, Russia has been required to make accommoda­
tions that in turn have limited its freedom of action. International observers in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia have increased the level of transparency and to 
some extent acculturated Russian forces to international norms regarding 
peacekeeping.39
Outside the Former Soviet Union
In contrast, the prospects for successful conflict management in areas lying 
outside the FSU are relatively bright. There, the full range of CCM capabilities 
has been employed and is likely to be available for use in the future. Rather 
than an insufficiency of capabilities, a principal challenge is posed by their dis­
persal among multiple organizations. No single RCMO can perform all the con­
flict management activities that might be desirable in a given instance. Each suf­
fers from important limitations in terms of geographical area of responsibility, 
functional mandate, and organizational capabilities and resources.
This decentralization can result in several different types of problems. First, 
the existence of multiple organizations may encourage buck-passing, as oc­
curred to some extent in the early stages of the fighting in the former Yu­
goslavia. At that time, NATO stood on the sidelines while the EU demonstrated 
the then very limited nature of abilities in the field of conflict management. Sec­
ond, it creates the potential for interorganizational conflict and the wasteful du­
plication of assets. Certainly, the initial deployment of separate NATO and WEU 
naval task forces in the Adriatic to monitor the UN embargo on the former Yu­
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goslavia did not represent the most efficient use of member states’ military re­
sources. So far, however, serious problems of this nature have been avoided, al­
though such concerns underlie many of the disagreements over the desirability 
and feasibility of an EU military force, given the existence of NATO. Thus at 
least as important as augmenting the conflict management capacity of European 
RCMOs is the need to ensure that their existing capabilities are well used 
through careful coordination both during and between crises.
At the same time, it is important to recognize the advantages afforded by this 
decentralization and perhaps even some organizational redundancy. It broad­
ens the range of options available to decision makers, providing them with fall­
backs should an initial approach prove ineffective. Likewise, it enables inter­
ested outside parties to bring multiple pressures to bear on conflict situations, 
as exemplified by the simultaneous NATO and EU diplomatic initiatives in 
Macedonia in 2001. Alternatively, decentralization may allow for effective task 
specialization and thus a politically wise distribution of the burdens of conflict 
management, as long as adequate coordination is attained. Indeed, the func­
tions and capabilities of the OSCE, NATO, and EU might be viewed as increas­
ingly complementary. Certainly, all three of these RCMOs in partnership with 
the UN have been able to accomplish more working side by side in Kosovo 
than any one of them might have achieved alone.
A further caveat follows from the enduring dependence of RCMOs on the 
UN, especially the need for approval by the UN Security Council for the under­
taking of coercive sanctions, peacekeeping, and other military actions. With the 
partial exception of the OSCE, which could, in principle, mount peacekeeping 
operations without reference to the global body, the security organizations in 
Europe lack the authority to engage in coercive or forceful activities on their 
own. Consequently, military actions without a UN mandate will lack legitimacy 
and, as a result, may want for domestic as well as international support.
To be sure, the recent case of Kosovo, where NATO forces engaged in a 
large-scale bombing campaign against Serbia over the objections of two per­
manent members of the Security Council, would seem to contradict this asser­
tion. Nevertheless, Kosovo is much more an exception to the rule than an indi­
cation of likely future trends. This aberration was only made possible by an 
unusual set of circumstances, particularly Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s 
long history of using violence and flouting international efforts to promote 
peace in the Balkans. Also noteworthy are the limited aims pursued by the 
NATO allies, which never denied Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, and the 
leading UN role in subsequent efforts to restore order in the province. In gen­
eral, NATO members remain unlikely to take forceful action without the prior 
approval of the UN.
Notwithstanding such constraints, the most striking feature of the current sit­
uation in Europe outside the FSU is the relative abundance of organizational ca­
pabilities for CCM in comparison with the potential need to employ them. Even 
as these capabilities were being built up during the 1990s, a number of regional
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conflicts were being defused and even resolved. Military conflict within and 
among the states of Central Eastern Europe now seems no more plausible than 
in Western Europe, and even parts of the former Yugoslavia—Slovenia and per­
haps now Croatia—have become highly stable. As a result, few political con­
flicts with a significant potential for violence remain outside of the FSU and the 
Balkans, and in almost every part of the Balkans, the major RCMOs are already 
heavily involved in activities ranging from the suppression of violence to post­
conflict rehabilitation.
The Future Importance of Transformational Processes
In view of this situation, one might be tempted to venture that, again with the 
exception of conflicts in the FSU, the main European RCMOs are in the process 
of putting themselves out of business. Such a conclusion would betray, however, 
an inappropriately narrow conception of conflict management. There is still 
much work to be done, but it is not the type of work, such as air strikes and ag­
gressive peacekeeping, that makes headlines. Rather, the focus will be on trans­
forming potential sites of conflict into stable, prosperous democracies where in­
ternal and international differences are consistently addressed through peaceful 
means. The ultimate goal would be to convert the entire region into a zone of 
peace in which militarized political conflict is impossible or unimaginable.
Each of the major RCMOs discussed in this chapter has already played a role 
in this transformational process and can continue to do so. In the case of the 
OSCE, focal points for such activities are the HCNM and the ODIHR. The man­
date of the HCNM describes the position as “an instrument of conflict prevention 
at the earliest possible stage.” As noted above, the High Commissioner’s role is 
to identify and to seek the early resolution of ethnic tensions. Although the 
HCNM is not intended to act as an advocate for national minorities, the HCNM’s 
recommendations to states often concern the adoption of measures to ensure 
adequate protection of the rights of persons belonging to minority groups.40
The ODIHR, founded in 1990 as the Office for Free Elections, works to trans­
form member states in three principal ways. It promotes democratic elections, 
particularly by monitoring election processes. It provides practical support, such 
as training programs, technical assistance, education projects, and the dissemina­
tion of information, for the consolidation of democratic institutions and human 
rights and the strengthening of civil society and the rule of law. And it monitors 
the compliance of member states with their human rights commitments.41
The transformational potentials of NATO and the EU are probably even 
greater. NATO already works to incorporate potential sites of conflict in Europe 
into the western zone of peace through two principal, related mechanisms. The 
first of these is the PFP, which from the beginning has had an explicitly trans­
formational agenda. A central purpose of the PFP has been to promote the com­
mitment to democratic principles. In particular, non-NATO participants pledge 
themselves to work toward democratic control of their armed forces and trans­
parency in national defense planning and budgeting.42
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The NATO enlargement process has taken these objectives a step further. The 
1995 “Study on NATO Enlargement” set forth the following transformational ra­
tionales: encouraging and supporting democratic reforms; promoting good- 
neighborly relations; increasing transparency in defense planning and military 
budgets; and reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in 
Europe based on shared democratic values. NATO has resisted establishing ex­
plicit criteria for membership. Nevertheless, successful applicants almost cer­
tainly have to be stable democracies. In addition, the prospect of membership 
provides aspirants with a powerful incentive to resolve conflicts with their 
neighbors, as exemplified by the successful conclusion of an agreement in 1996 
between Hungary and Romania regarding the Hungarian minority in Transyl­
vania after years of bickering.43 Although some have questioned whether NATO 
has in fact done anything to advance democratization,44 membership in the al­
liance seems certain to lock in the important democratic gains that have been 
made in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War.
In the long term, however, it may be the EU that does the most to eliminate 
the potential for military conflict in Europe. The EU disposes of unmatched ma­
terial resources that can be used to promote economic development, internal 
reform, and external reconciliation in potential or actual trouble spots. A lead­
ing example of such an effort is the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process, 
which offers substantial economic, financial, and technical assistance to five 
Balkan states in return for their compliance with a variety of conditions regard­
ing political and economic development and regional cooperation.45
Additional resources are being devoted to preparing twelve candidate coun­
tries for membership. Although these states are already characterized by stable 
democratic institutions, substantial progress toward the establishment of market 
economies, and relatively good human rights records, the process of preparing 
for EU membership entails undertaking internal changes that go far beyond 
those required by NATO. Once admitted, moreover, new members will find 
themselves enmeshed in a set of institutional relationships, involving the sacri­
fice of some national sovereignty, that largely precludes the possibility of and 
eliminates the utility of resorting to political violence. A further advantage of the 
EU is that it is not encumbered like NATO by the baggage of the Cold War, al­
lowing it to include among its current candidate members Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, all former Soviet republics.
Thus, it seems quite plausible that, within a decade or two, the zone of 
peace will have expanded to include most of Europe outside of the FSU and 
even the Baltic states. Most if not all of these states either will be full members 
of the EU and NATO or will enjoy very close ties with both organizations. With 
the exception of the remaining areas of the FSU, traditional conflict manage­
ment activities—early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and so 
on—will have been rendered largely irrelevant. It can also be reasonably 
hoped that substantial and growing ties between the inhabitants of this region 
and their eastern neighbors, especially Russia and Ukraine, will exert pacify­
ing and stabilizing effects on the latter.
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Perhaps the biggest remaining question is whether the members of NATO 
and the EU will have the political will to see this transformational process 
through to a desirable conclusion. The costs of EU enlargement, while proba­
bly manageable, have nevertheless engendered stiff political opposition from 
many of the domestic actors who stand to lose. The NATO deployments in 
Bosnia and Kosovo have frequently been criticized for their open-ended nature 
and the lack of any well-defined exit strategies. And the new Bush administra­
tion took office in 2001 having talked in the presidential campaign about es­
tablishing a new “division of labor” within NATO, whereby the United States 
would no longer participate in Balkan peacekeeping operations, a move that 
many observers feared would prevent the West from achieving its goals in the 
region and could even pose a serious threat to the alliance itself.46
One should not exaggerate the obstacles, however. Despite the criticism di­
rected at the NATO deployments in the Balkans, they have proven remarkably 
enduring. Certainly, the experience of Bosnia, where alliance forces have been 
stationed for more than half a decade, suggests that it may be possible to sus­
tain such missions for an extended period of time. And it did not take long for 
President Bush to affirm the continuing importance of full U.S. participation.47 
Finally, although enlargement of the EU to include states from the former So­
viet bloc is not yet a certainty, the organization took the final steps in the 
process of preparing itself for the acceptance of new members with the ap­
proval of Treaty of Nice in late 2000. The completion of the current negotiations 
on accession now seems to be just a matter of time.
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